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Abstract: Although most people present themselves as possessing prosocial traits, people differ in the extent to which
they actually act prosocially in everyday life. Qualitative data that were not ostensibly collected to measure
prosociality might contain information about prosocial dispositions that is not distorted by self-presentation concerns.
This paper seeks to characterise charitable donors from qualitative data. We compared a manual approach of
extracting predictors from participants’ self-described personal strivings to two automated approaches: A summation
of words predeﬁned as prosocial and a support vector machine classiﬁer. Although variables extracted by the support
vector machine predicted donation behaviour well in the training sample (N = 984), virtually, no variables from any
method signiﬁcantly predicted donations in a holdout sample (N = 496). Raters’ attempts to predict donations to char-
ity based on reading participants’ personal strivings were also unsuccessful. However, raters’ predictions were asso-
ciated with past charitable involvement. In sum, predictors derived from personal strivings did not robustly explain
variation in charitable behaviour, but personal strivings may nevertheless contain some information about trait
prosociality. The sparseness of personal strivings data, rather than the irrelevance of open-ended text or individual
differences in goal pursuit, likely explains their limited value in predicting prosocial behaviour. © 2020 European
Association of Personality Psychology
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INTRODUCTION
Although many personality traits are best measured through
self-report, people do not always provide accurate reports
of their motives and behaviour (Sun & Vazire, 2019; Vazire,
2010). Prosocial traits like generosity, honesty, and fairness
are particularly difﬁcult to measure validly because people
present themselves favourably (Paulhus & John, 1998).
Favourable self-presentation of prosocial traits is pervasive
because moral character plays a central role in social judge-
ment, guiding decisions about cooperation and exclusion
(Baumard, André, & Sperber, 2013; Goodwin, Piazza, &
Rozin, 2014). Thus, even people who are not generous, hon-
est, or fair have incentives to present as if they are.
Relative to self-report measures, measures of actual
prosocial behaviour can be more diagnostic of prosocial
traits. Unlike declarations of prosociality, prosocial behav-
iour typically involves real costs (e.g. time, resources, safety,
etc.). However, incentives to present as prosocial are not only
present when they complete self-report questionnaires, but
also when people behave in any public domain (Barclay &
Willer, 2006). When the costs of behaving prosocially are
low or the potential reputational beneﬁts to helping are high,
observed prosocial behaviour is perhaps just as likely as self-
reported prosociality to be motivated by self-presentation
concerns (Batson & Shaw, 1991).
Qualitative data—in particular open-ended text generated
by participants in structured interviews, essays, sentence
completion tasks, etc.—may have unique advantages in mea-
suring trait prosociality. Open-ended tasks are less transpar-
ent than direct self-report in what they are intending to
measure, which may reduce socially desirable responding be-
cause participants do not know if or how they are being eval-
uated. For example, when directly asked about the
importance of prosocial goals, most people rate prosocial
goals as important to them, but when asked to list the goals
that are important to them, far fewer people spontaneously
mention prosocial goals (Frimer, Schaefer, & Oakes, 2014).
Furthermore, responses to open-ended questions can reveal
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new insights because they are unconstrained by researchers’
preconceptions about which predictors are most important to
measure.
This paper focuses on the use of qualitative data to under-
stand individual differences in prosociality. To maximise the
relevance of our inquiry to personality researchers, we use
measures and analysis techniques that researchers with lim-
ited resources or familiarity with machine learning tech-
niques could implement. The success of this approach can
speak to whether personality researchers need to change
how they conduct research in order to reap the advantages
of open-ended text measures.
Manual text analysis
Qualitative data have long been used to characterise extremely
prosocial people and generate new insights about the nature of
prosociality. Exemplar studies frequently use open-ended
prompts and structured interviews to understand ‘moral exem-
plars’—people who have engaged in extreme prosocial acts
that are likely to be non-instrumental, such as anonymously
donating a kidney to a stranger (Marsh et al., 2014). Quantita-
tive predictors derived from participants’ natural language can
outperform self-report measures in characterising exemplars.
Walker and Frimer (2007) found that 50 people who had
won an award for helping others (e.g. risking their lives to
save others) were no different in self-reported personality
traits from 50 demographically matched controls. In contrast,
thematic coding of qualitative data was able to distinguish
moral exemplars from matched controls (Frimer, Walker,
Dunlop, Lee, & Riches, 2011). Qualitative data have also fa-
cilitated theory development. Close readings of text generated
by exemplars have uncovered the role of redemption narra-
tives in generativity (Mansﬁeld & McAdams, 1996) and the
role of idealistic peers in encouraging commitment to moral
causes (Colby & Damon, 1992). These insights may have
eluded researchers using only theory-constrained measures.
Although suggestive, the results of exemplar studies do
not conclusively show that qualitative data contain more
valid information about trait prosociality than self-report
questionnaires. One reason is that exemplar studies do not
sample people who show typical levels (i.e. close to the pop-
ulation mean) of prosociality. Instead, they focus on extreme
manifestations of prosociality, which may introduce selec-
tion bias (Preacher, Rucker, MacCallum, & Nicewander,
2005). In addition, exemplar studies typically have modest
sample sizes (e.g. the previously described 50 exemplars in
Walker & Frimer, 2007). These modest sample sizes result
from practical constraints: Moral exemplars are uncommon,
and recruiting them is time-consuming and often expensive.
Even if difﬁculties in recruiting moral exemplars could be
overcome, manually coding open-ended audio and text re-
quires extensive labour, and is therefore infeasible in large
sample studies. Although understandable, the small samples
of exemplar studies limit their ability to accurately estimate
effect sizes. Simulations in contexts typical of personality re-
search suggest that more than 200 participants are needed to
obtain accurate and stable estimates of effect sizes
(Schönbrodt & Perugini, 2013). Yet, to our knowledge, only
one exemplar study had more than 200 participants (Oliner &
Oliner, 1988). Given the absence of evidence from large,
non-exemplar samples, it is unclear whether qualitative data
can be used to measure prosociality with high validity.
The rise of automated text analysis
Deriving nomothetic measures from text is resource inten-
sive, but recent years have seen an increase in automated
methods for capturing personality differences. Such methods
can be broadly grouped into ‘closed-vocabulary’ and ‘open-
vocabulary’ techniques. Closed-vocabulary techniques code
text data according to the presence or absence of a pre-
existing set of words. Like manual coding, closed-vocabulary
approaches require the researcher to choose which words to
code, based on either conceptual correspondence with the
outcome of interest or based on a theory about the process that
generates the outcome of interest. For example, Rand and
Epstein (2014) used a dictionary of inhibition-related words
(e.g. ‘constrain’, ‘stop’) to characterise interviews in which
Carnegie Hero Medal recipients described the thoughts they
had when they risked their own lives to rescue others. The au-
thors found that the recipients’ thoughts were more similar to
control descriptions of intuitive thoughts than to control de-
scriptions of deliberative thoughts. Rand and Epstein (2014)
concluded that costly helping acts are based on intuitive
rather than deliberate decision-making processes.
In contrast, open-vocabulary techniques identify words
and other aspects of language (e.g. phrases, letters, or punc-
tuation) that are associated with a focal outcome. Open-
vocabulary approaches sometimes overﬁt data, leveraging
noise in a sample to optimise prediction in a way that will
not generalise to new data. To avoid overﬁtting, open-
vocabulary techniques are often paired with cross-validation
techniques. For instance, Park et al. (2015) used an open-
vocabulary approach, ridge regression, to ﬁnd the words
and topics in a ‘training’ sample of about 66 000 people’s
Facebook statuses that predicted scores on questionnaire
measures of Big Five personality traits. To estimate how well
their model would predict new data, they used its parameter
estimates to predict questionnaire measures in a ‘holdout’
sample of 4824 people who were not included in the training
sample. The model was successful in predicting Big Five
traits on both the training and holdout data sets, suggesting
that social media behaviours can be used as markers of stable
individual differences. Furthermore, examination of the word
features also generated novel insights into the nature of Big
Five traits. For example, Facebook statuses that lamented
rude and selﬁsh behaviour were associated with agreeable-
ness—the Big Five trait most related to prosocial behaviour
(Graziano & Eisenberg, 1997). Although other qualitative in-
vestigations have suggested that moral exemplars have
strong convictions (Damon & Colby, 2015), researchers do
not typically mention condemnation as a prototypical behav-
iour of agreeable people.
Although both closed-vocabulary and open-vocabulary
methods of coding qualitative data may be more efﬁcient than
manual methods, they may not work as well in all circum-
stances. Open-vocabulary approaches sometimes require
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larger samples than a single research group can afford to col-
lect (Yarkoni & Westfall, 2017). This is particularly true
when words appear infrequently in text because sparseness
makes it difﬁcult to detect reliable associations between indi-
vidual word features and outcomes. Second, many ‘out-of-
the-box’ automated methods may not be sophisticated
enough to replace manual coding. The meaning of words is
context dependent, and human raters are sensitive to the over-
all context of open-ended text data. Although there are
methods of machine learning (e.g. neural networks) that train
models on large corpora of natural language and can accom-
modate such subtleties, the most accessible methods divorce
words from the grammatical structure that determines their
meaning. For instance, a dictionary of prosocial words likely
would not include the word ‘money’. However, a human rater
would recognize when money is being used to beneﬁt others
(e.g. ‘I am trying to make more money to send my daughter to
college’). Automated methods developed in the context of
‘big data’ analysis have the potential to replace or supplement
manual methods of coding qualitative data, but their utility in
personality research as it is normally conducted is unknown.
The present study
The present study aims to use qualitative data to capture in-
dividual differences in prosociality. We compare manual
and automated methods of deriving quantitative predictors
from people’s qualitative descriptions of goals they routinely
pursue. In particular, we attempted to extract information
from participants’ personal strivings that would predict both
whether and how much of their study compensation they do-
nated to charity. We extracted quantitative predictors using
three different coding methods: (i) human raters trained to
code for themes reﬂecting universal values using a validated
manual (the ‘manual’ approach), (ii) a dictionary of prosocial
words (the closed-vocabulary approach), and (iii) a support
vector machine (SVM) classiﬁer (the open-vocabulary ap-
proach). We also evaluated how much variability in charita-
ble behaviour each coding method accounted for on its own
in the context of logistic regression (whether or not the par-
ticipant donated) and linear regression (the proportion of bo-
nus payment that the participant donated). To quantify each
method’s success in relative terms, we also observed how
well past charitable involvement predicted donation deci-
sions. Finally, we used a holdout sample to assess whether
signiﬁcant effects that we observe emerge in new data.
METHODS
Recruitment
We used data from two studies that were conducted on
Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk (Study 1: N = 814, 410
women, Mage = 36.6, SDage = 11.19; Study 2: N = 778, 350
women, Mage = 35.75, SDage = 11.45). All participants in
both studies were from the USA. Participants in Study 1 were
offered $1.00 to begin the study and $2.00 bonus payment
for completing the study. Participants from Study 1 were
not allowed to enrol in Study 2. Participants in Study 2 were
offered $1.00 to begin the study and a $4.00 bonus payment
for completing the study.
Procedure
The full procedure of both studies were described in detail
elsewhere (McAuliffe, 2019; McCauley & McCullough,
2019); here, we describe only the details that are relevant to
the present analysis (see these study materials here: https://
osf.io/f3ckm/). After providing informed consent, both stud-
ies began with the Personal Strivings List (Emmons, 1999).
To complete the list, participants completed the sentence ‘I
typically try to …’ with their personal strivings—that is,
the goals that they are trying to achieve in their everyday
lives. Strivings are idiographic in the sense that they are
personalised (e.g. ‘I am typically trying to gain back my
spouse’s trust’) but are nomothetic in the sense that they
can be classiﬁed into a type of motive (e.g. a desire to sustain
afﬁliations). Strivings are thought to represent individual dif-
ferences in motivation better than other personality
constructs (Dunlop, 2015; McAdams, 1995). Studies suggest
that nomothetic variables derived from strivings have con-
vergent validity (Hart, McAdams, Hirsch, & Bauer, 2001)
and predict prosocial behaviour in the laboratory (Magee &
Langner, 2008) and in everyday life (Frimer et al., 2011).
Participants reported the 10 strivings that best character-
ise their prototypical motives. We used an abbreviated ver-
sion of the instructions provided by Emmons (1999) that
included several example strivings and encouraged partici-
pants to consider all of the goals that they are pursuing in
the myriad domains of their lives. Two research assistants
corrected typos and misspellings before we conducted the
automated analyses. The strivings were relatively short for
open-ended text (mean words in combined strivings per
person = 48.25, SD = 20.00). Word sparseness can make it
difﬁcult for automated methods to identify relationships
between word features and behavioural outcomes (Banks,
Woznyj, Wesslen, & Ross, 2018). We took steps to mitigate
sparseness at each stage of our procedure.
Subsequently, participants in both studies completed sev-
eral individual difference measures. These measures were be-
yond the scope of the present study save for a subset of items
from the Self-Report Altruism Scale related to charity
(Rushton,Chrisjohn, & Fekken, 1981) that was administered
in Study 1. Participants completed the self-report altruism
scale by reporting the number of times they have performed
29 (20 from the original scale, and 9 pilot items developed by
us) different helpful acts (1 = never, 2 = once, 3 = more than
once, 4 = often, 5 = very often). To derive a measure of past
charitable involvement (omega = .79; M = 2.55; SD = 0.77),
we averaged three items from the original scale (‘I have
given money to a charity’, ‘I have donated goods or clothes
to a charity’, and ‘I have done volunteer work for a charity’)
with three additional items about charitable involvement that
we created (‘I have participated in a charity fundraising event
(e.g. a 5k run)’, ‘I have performed an administrative role for a
charitable cause’, and ‘I have made a “pledge” to make a reg-
ular contribution to a charitable cause’).
Searching for prosociality in qualitative data
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Finally, participants were told that they would watch a
video made by a charity about a social problem. In Study 1,
participants watched a video made by Oxfam, documenting
a family of refugees ﬂeeing civil war in South Sudan. In
Study 2, participants watched a video we created
documenting recent hurricane victims, and that United Na-
tions Children’s Fund was aiming to help them. Then, partic-
ipants used a sliding scale to indicate how much of their
bonus payment ($2.00 in Study 1, $4.00 in Study 2) that they
would like to donate (in $0.05 increments in Study 1 and
$0.10 increments in Study 2) to charity (Oxfam in Study 1:
M = $0.55, SD = $0.66; United Nations Children’s Fund in
Study 2: M = $0.86, SD = $1.11). After making a donation
decision, Study 1 ended. In Study 2, after making a donation
decision, participants observed and reported the outcome of
a coin ﬂip that could nullify their donation decision. Analysis
of the coin ﬂip task will be reported in another paper
(McCauley & McCullough, 2019).
Charitable giving tasks are similar to economic game
measures that are increasingly used by personality re-
searchers to measure prosocial behaviour (Zhao & Smillie,
2015). Whether people give money in these tasks is associ-
ated with dispositional factors (Thielmann, Spadaro, &
Balliet, 2020). Millions of people donate to charity each year
(List, 2011), making charitable donations a plausible out-
come of the goals people pursue in daily life.
RESULTS
Deriving predictors from qualitative text
Manual approach
In the manual approach, we had research assistants code per-
sonal strivings using the Values Embedded in Narrative
(VEiNs) manual (Frimer, Walker, & Dunlop, 2009; see man-
ual at http://www.jeremyfrimer.com/research-downloads.
html) that describes how to code for 10 values that Schwartz
(1994) identiﬁed as pancultural (Table 1). These values fall
into two higher order dimensions: self-transcendence (benev-
olence and universalism) versus self-enhancement (power,
achievement, and hedonism) and openness to change (self-
direction, stimulation, and hedonism) versus conservation
(tradition and conformity). Frimer et al. (2011) found that
moral exemplars reported not only more self-transcendence
strivings than matched controls, but also more self-
enhancement strivings.
Each striving was coded by two raters who had no infor-
mation about participants (including their donation status).
Raters went through a thorough training process: For each
value, they completed half of the manual’s practice set of
400 strivings, referred to the ‘correct’ answers and discussed
confusions with the ﬁrst author, and then completed the re-
maining 200 practice strivings. Raters coded no more than
two values at a time. The ﬁrst author calculated interrater re-
liabilities (Table 1) and resolved coding disagreements. Each
participant received a sum score for each of the 10 values
(Table 1).
The VEiNs manual recommends interrater reliability of
κ ≥ .60, which is considered ‘substantial agreement’ accord-
ing to conventional benchmarks (Landis & Koch, 1977). We
Table 1. Universal value means, standard deviations, and inter-
rater reliabilities in Study 1 and Study 2
Universal
value
Study 1 Study 2
M SD Κ M SD Κ
Benevolence 2.38 1.61 .82 2.57 1.68 .82
Universalism 0.23 0.56 .63 0.41 0.69 .66
Conformity 0.84 0.96 .65 0.89 1.01 .70
Tradition 0.44 0.73 .56 0.59 0.83 .68
Security 2.25 1.74 .78 2.23 1.74 .83
Hedonism 0.84 1.00 .61 0.77 1.00 .82
Self-direction 2.22 2.19 .87 2.18 2.12 .86
Stimulation 0.63 0.87 .40 0.61 0.83 .65
Achievement 2.16 2.00 .49 2.54 2.07 .84
Power 1.16 1.17 .70 0.88 1.13 .79
Note: M and SD are used to represent mean and standard deviation, respec-
tively.Κ is used to represent Kappa. In Study 1, N = 778. In Study 2, N = 726.
Table 2. Words with largest average weight across 10-fold cross-validation of support vector machine classiﬁer
Weight rank
Word M weight M Min Max Runs ranked in top 10 % of donors % of non-donors
Easy 0.4496 3.6 1 19 9 1.19 0.00
God 0.4150 6.2 1 27 8 1.71 1.51
Shows 0.3736 11.5 2 55 8 0.17 1.00
Timely 0.3304 15.9 4 32 4 2.05 0.25
Career 0.3208 18.8 5 31 3 3.75 0.25
Mind 0.3438 21 3 90 6 2.39 4.27
Sleep 0.3164 22.4 5 39 2 9.04 11.31
Sister 0.3193 26.4 1 94 2 0.34 2.01
Causing 0.3058 30.4 4 88 2 0.00 0.75
Thrifty 0.3233 31.3 3 170 2 0.00 0.75
Safely 0.2946 31.9 9 75 1 1.00 1.19
Note:Weights provide information about importance of the word relative to all others in a particular model. Mean weight is the average weight across 10 runs of
10-fold CV. % of Donors is the proportion of participants who donated at least $0.01 who used the word at least once in their personal strivings. % of non-donors
is the proportion of participants who donated no money and used the word at least once in their personal strivings. N in the training set was 984.
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investigated why agreement fell below this threshold for tra-
dition, achievement, and stimulation in Study 1. For achieve-
ment and stimulation, the ﬁrst author’s corrections showed
only ‘fair’ agreement with this rater, but ‘almost perfect’
agreement with the other rater. For tradition, raters disagreed
on how to code a few common strivings, perhaps because
they were rare in the practice strivings set. Thus, the ﬁrst au-
thor acted as a third rater for tradition and, at times, overruled
agreement among both raters. Interrater reliability was more
consistent for Study 2, with all kappas greater than .6.
Closed-vocabulary approach
We used a dictionary of 127 word stems that have been used
to characterise the prevalence of prosocial language in study
settings (Frimer et al., 2014) and transcripts of public pro-
ceedings (Frimer, Aquino, Gebauer, Zhu, & Oakes, 2015).
Because many applied researchers are familiar with the
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) programme
(Pennebaker, Booth, & Francis, 2007), we used TACIT’s
(Dehghani et al., 2017) LIWC-style word count plugin to
count how many times participants used each of the word
stems in their strivings. TACIT is a free, online tool that
was designed to be user-friendly for psychologists who have
only a rudimentary background in conducting text analysis.
Prosocial dictionary word counts were generated by cre-
ating a dictionary ﬁle with words from Frimer et al. (2015).
Example words included charit*, good, and volunteer (see
http://www.jeremyfrimer.com/research-downloads.html for
a complete list). Individual text ﬁles of all 10 strivings were
created for each participant. Using the uploaded dictionary
ﬁle, TACIT created a ﬁle for every participant who used
any word in the prosocial dictionary in any of their strivings.
These ﬁles were used to count the number of times each of
the 127 words appeared in each participant’s combined
strivings.
Open-vocabulary approach
There were two phases to our open-vocabulary approach.
First, we used TACIT’s SVM classiﬁer to identify the lin-
guistic features most predictive of whether participants do-
nated. Like other machine-learning approaches, SVM
optimises classiﬁcation accuracy. Optimisation on one data
set can cause overﬁtting, resulting in a set of features that
does not generalise to new samples. To identify features that
were more likely to generalise to new samples, we used
10-fold cross validation, which means that TACIT iterated
the model training process 10 times, with a given 10% subset
of the data serving as the validation set once and comprising
part of the training sample in the nine other iterations. Then,
TACIT selects the best model based on its performance in
each validation set, producing 10 models. This allowed us
to eliminate features that predict donations only because of
sampling error in the held-in training set. Furthermore, we
used a separate holdout sample to assess the performance
of all features, including those derived from SVM. That is,
before we conducted the SVM, we randomly selected 33%
of observations in our sample (stratiﬁed on donation status)
to serve as a validation set. These observations were not in-
cluded in the SVM analysis and allowed us to estimate
how well models using these features would perform in
new samples. The SVM approach was not compellingly use-
ful; across the 10 runs, model accuracy ranged from 50.5% to
63.6% (average = 53.7%), and nine of the 10 p-values were
larger than 0.05.
In the second phase of our open-vocabulary approach, we
used the results of the SVM analyses (i.e. the weights associ-
ated with extracted feature in each SVM) to select the ﬁnal
set of SVM-derived features. We ranked the absolute value
of the weight of each feature in each run. We selected fea-
tures that (i) had consistent weight direction and class associ-
ation across runs, (ii) were in the top 127 of at least three
runs, and (iii) were words (e.g. we dropped ‘M’). Then, we
used TACIT’s LIWC-style dictionary tool to count the fre-
quency of each word in participants’ combined strivings.
We counted the presence of SVM-identiﬁed words in the en-
tire data set (but, again, the SVM was run using only the
training set). The procedure we used to select SVM features
was similar, but not identical to, the procedure we described
in our preregistration. The preregistered procedure resulted in
features (e.g. M) that were not meaningful words or that ap-
peared only once in the entire data set.
Analytic approach
Our preregistration explains both our prior knowledge of the
data sets, our planned analyses for the current study, and our
hypotheses (https://osf.io/b254j).
Data exclusions
We excluded data from participants who did not make a de-
cision about whether to donate or did not complete all 10
strivings. Participants who clearly did not take the strivings
task seriously (e.g. wrote ‘blablabla’ for all 10 strivings)
were also excluded. These exclusions left 1480 usable cases.
This ﬁnal N is one case smaller than the number of cases we
expected to be able to use in our preregistration; after the
preregistration, we identiﬁed an additional case in which
the participant did not take the strivings task seriously. In a
deviation from our preregistration, we split the data set into
a training set with two thirds (n = 984) of usable cases and
a holdout set of one third (n = 496) instead of our originally
planned seven tenths training–three tenths holdout split. We
found it was easier to use a two thirds–one third split to
create equal-sized folds that had the same percentage of
donors versus non-donors. Power analyses using G*Power
(Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) revealed that we
have 80% power to explain as little as 1.64% of variance
in the training sample and 3.23% of variance explained
in the holdout sample (based on 10 predictors and an alpha
of .05).
The training and holdout sets included data from both
Study 1 and Study 2 in order to prevent optimising the results
to idiosyncratic features of either study. Because Study 1 and
Study 2 involved different amounts of money, we trans-
formed donation amounts to proportions for linear regression
analyses. Of course, putting the raw donation amounts from
both studies on a common metric does not necessarily make
donation decisions across studies directly comparable.
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Indeed, participants from Study 2 donated a signiﬁcantly
smaller proportion of their bonus payment in the training
set, b = .06, se = .02, t = 3.05, p = .002, 95% conﬁdence
interval (CI) [0.10, 0.02], and in the holdout set,
b = .08, se = .03, t = 2.93, p = .003, 95% CI [0.13,
0.03]. Moreover, combining data across studies could in-
troduce correlated residuals, causing us to underestimate
standard errors. To correct for these biases, we included a
study dummy variable (0 = Study 1, 1 = Study 2) as a covar-
iate in all regression models that included data from both
studies.
Identifying the top 10 predictors
Because our primary goal was to identify word features that
may yield new insight into charitable donors, we focused
on ﬁnding a small set of predictors that maximise prediction
of prosocial behaviour. We settled on 10 predictors on the
premise that researchers may want to know whether they
should manually code for all ten universal values or instead
code some other set of ten features. We created two ‘top
10’ predictor lists: One for the decision to make a donation
at all and one for donation proportion.
Our candidate set of predictors came from each of our
three methods. We considered all 10 universal values from
our manual coding approach. From our closed-dictionary ap-
proach, all 127 word stems were candidates. For our open-
vocabulary approach, the 127 word features that had the
highest weights1 across SVM runs were candidates. Vari-
ables from both the prosocial dictionary words and the
SVM method were sparse (see supplement: https://osf.io/
wajxq/).
We identiﬁed the top 10 predictors from our candidate set
using stochastic search variable selection (SSVS). SSVS uses
Gibbs sampling, a Markov chain Monte Carlo procedure that
simulates the joint density distribution for an outcome and a
set of predictors, to determine which predictors consistently
predict the outcome, even after accounting for variability in
the other predictors included in the model (George &
McCulloch, 1993). Gibbs sampling is useful in the context
of variable selection because, after observing many ‘warm-
up’ samples, it primarily simulates probability distributions
that have the highest posterior probability values, iteratively
ranking the posteriors produced in each run of the simulation.
Thus, as the number of runs increases, models with higher
ranking posteriors are selected more frequently, and models
that possess strong predictors of the outcome are more likely
to be estimated.
We used the R code available from Bainter, McCauley,
Wager, and Losin (n.d., in press) to run the SSVS models.
We based results on 20 000 regression models (the ﬁrst
5000 were discarded warm-ups) that sample different combi-
nations of the 102 predictors. All predictors had prior proba-
bilities of .50. We chose the 10 variables that had the highest
‘marginal inclusion probability’(MIP) (i.e. the proportion of
times a predictor is included in the most predictive models)
to represent the top 10 predictors.
Although we lacked predictions about which speciﬁc
word features would be most strongly associated with dona-
tion decisions, we hypothesised that words from the SVM
would be more likely to appear in the top 10 features that
predict decisions to make a donation because it is designed
to maximise prediction in the training set. We did not extend
this hypothesis to the SSVS for predicting donation propor-
tion because the SVM was trained only to predict whether
participants would donate at all.
Our second hypothesis was that, if anymanually coded uni-
versal values appeared in the top 10 models, they would be be-
nevolence, universalism, power, or achievement. These four
values have been found to distinguish extraordinarily prosocial
individuals frommatched controls (Frimer et al., 2011). In con-
trast, there is no evidence yet that VEiNs coding of the other six
values are useful in predicting prosocial behaviour.
The SSVS does not estimate multicollinearity among pre-
dictive variables, and text analysis methods often produce
multicollinear predictors (Firmin, Bonﬁls, Luther, Minor, &
Salyers, 2017). To characterise multicollinearity among each
of our top 10 predictors, we used dominance analysis (DA;
Azen & Budescu, 2003) and its extension to logistic regression
(Azen & Traxel, 2009). DA assesses the variance explained by
all possible subsets of a set of predictors. For each predictor, it
provides the average variance explained and the proportion of
models in which it explains more variance than a second pre-
dictor. We used the DA package in R to perform analyses on
both the training and holdout set (Bustos & Soares, 2019). Be-
cause multicollinearity was low and prediction was generally
poor, the DA analyses were uninformative and we relegated
them to supplemental materials: https://osf.io/379ku/.
Preregistered analyses: Which word features best predict
charitable donations?
The analyses reported below were all conducted in R version
3.6 (R Core Team, 2019). The syntax can be found here:
https://osf.io/5yac4/; the training data set can be found here:
https://osf.io/x3ems/; and the holdout data set can be found
here: https://osf.io/8xpqh/. All tests were two-tailed with an
alpha of .05.
Stochastic search variable selection
The SSVS on the training set yielded discouraging results for
both decisions to make a donation and donation proportion
(see Figures 1 and 2 for full results). For the donation deci-
sion (i.e. binary logistic) SSVS, only ‘career’, had an MIP
greater than .50. ‘Gain*’ had an MIP of .45, and the other
eight features (‘sister*’, ‘easy*’, ‘everyone’, ‘visit’, ‘me’,
1Many features were identiﬁed by SVM runs, but in our preregistered anal-
ysis plan, we limited ourselves to 127 features for parity with the prosocial
word dictionary. After looking at these 127 words, we deviated from our pre-
registration to avoid overﬁtting by further restricting this variable set as fol-
lows: (i) we removed both SVM and prosocial dictionary words that
appeared in fewer than 10 participants’ data; (ii) we combined similar
SVM words into one stem (e.g. ‘listen’ and ‘listener’); (iii) we stemmed all
SVM words (e.g. one of the SVM words was ‘social’ and we counted ‘so-
cially’, ‘socializing’, and ‘socialize’). After these steps, there were 102 pre-
dictors available for Stochastic Variable Search Selection (SSVS) analyses
(with some overlap in the predictors contributed by SVM and the prosocial
dictionary).
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‘positive*’, ‘towards’, and self-direction values) all had
MIPs lower than .20, indicating that consideration of the data
reduced their probability of inclusion in models with high
posterior probability. One feature was from the prosocial dic-
tionary (‘everyone’), one was from manual coding (self-di-
rection values), and the other eight were from SVM.
For the donation proportion SSVS, ‘career’ and ‘sister*’
again appeared among the features with the 10 highest MIPs.
Only two words, ‘career’ and ‘positive*’, had MIPs greater
than .5. The other eight top 10 features, ‘mind*’, ‘respect*’,
‘safe*’, ‘sister*’, ‘travel*’, ‘spend*’, ‘church’, and universal-
ism values, all had MIPs lower than .18. Besides universal-
ism values, all top features came from SVM, although
‘respect*’ is both an SVM word and a prosocial dictionary
word.
Regression models featuring the top 10 predictors
We began by entering the study dummy and all top 10 pre-
dictors from the logistic SSVS as predictors of making a do-
nation, using the training data set (Table 3). The model
explained 4.55% of overall variance (based on McFadden’s
R2) and signiﬁcantly improved on an intercept-only model,
χ2 (11) = 60.36, p < .001. ‘Career,’ ‘gain*,’ and ‘easy*’
had signiﬁcant, positive effects, while ‘sister’ had a
Figure 2. Results from the stochastic search variable selection model predicting proportion of bonus payment donated to charity. MIP, marginal inclusion prob-
ability. [Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Table 3. Logistic regression of “top 10” word features on donation
decision
Data set OR p 95% CI
Career Training 12.31 .014 [2.58, 221.21]
Holdout 1.48 .522 [0.47, 5.53]
Positive* Training 1.57 .059 [0.99, 2.55]
Holdout 0.65 .187 [0.34, 1.23]
Gain* Training 3.85 .029 [1.34, 16.32]
Holdout 1.14 .823 [0.34, 4.53]
Easy* Training 4.70 .046 [1.25, 30.72]
Holdout 1.70 .595 [0.30, 29.28]
Everyone Training 1.51 .070 [0.98, 2.40]
Holdout 1.29 .301 [0.81, 2.17]
Sister* Training 0.26 .032 [0.07, 0.83]
Holdout 0.63 .654 [0.07, 5.43]
Visit Training 3.37 .106 [0.96, 21.39]
Holdout 1.22 .790 [0.28, 6.25]
Me Training 1.32 .066 [0.99, 1.80]
Holdout 0.86 .353 [0.63, 1.18]
Towards Training 1.92 .121 [0.90, 4.83]
Holdout 1.40 .527 [0.51, 4.44]
Self-direction Training 1.05 .109 [0.99, 1.12]
Holdout 1.10 .029 [1.01, 1.21]
Study dummy Training 0.98 .909 [0.76, 1.28]
Holdout 0.85 .397 [0.59, 1.23]
Note: * = word stem. Study dummy = the effect of participating in Study 2
rather than Study 1. OR = odds ratio for making a donation. Conﬁdence in-
tervals are exponentiated. All tests were two-tailed with an alpha of .05.
Figure 1. Results from the stochastic search variable selection model predicting decisions to make a non-zero donation to charity. MIP, marginal inclusion
probability. [Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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signiﬁcant negative effect. The other words had non-
signiﬁcant effects. The variance inﬂation factors (VIFs) were
all less than 1.04, suggesting that the estimation and interpre-
tation of coefﬁcients were not obscured by overlapping
variance.
To determine whether the associations we observed
would generalise to data that the predictors were not trained
on, we then conducted the same logistic regression model
on the holdout set (Table 3). The model explained 1.52%
of variance and was not a signiﬁcant improvement on an
intercept-only model, χ2(11) = 10.17, p = .516. There was a
signiﬁcant, positive effect of self-direction; no other effects
were signiﬁcant. Multicollinearity was again too low to pro-
vide a ready explanation for non-signiﬁcant effects (all
VIFs < 1.06).
Next, we entered all top 10 predictors from the donation
proportion SSVS and the study dummy variable as predictors
of the proportion of bonus payment donated to charity, using
the training data set (Table 4). The model was signiﬁcant,
F(11, 972) = 5.87, p < .001, adjusted R2 = .051. Universal-
ism was, contrary to our expectations, negatively associated
with donations. Multicollinearity was again low (all
VIFs < 1.05).
Next, we created a linear multiple regression model with
the same 11 predictors and the same outcome, but this time
on the holdout data set. The model was just barely signiﬁ-
cant, F(11, 484) = 1.81, p = .050, adjusted R2 = .018, and ‘re-
spect*’ was the only signiﬁcant predictor other than the study
dummy variable. Multicollinearity was again low (all
VIFs < 1.07).
Exploratory analyses: Which coding method best
predicts charitable giving?
We were unsure whether to interpret the null results from
our preregistered analyses as an artefact of only using the
top 10 word features as predictors. To the extent that
SVM predictors ‘won’ in the SSVS simply because the
SVM was designed to maximise prediction in the training
set, we may have overlooked word features from other
coding methods that have reliable associations with charita-
ble giving. Moreover, it is arguably unreasonable to expect
any one variable, especially when sparse, to evince a
strong association with a behavioural outcome. Using
many predictors, either aggregated together or used sepa-
rately but simultaneously, is more likely to do justice to
the myriad causes that come together to cause any one ac-
tion (Seeboth & Mõttus, 2018).
We decided to conduct exploratory regressions that used
all variables from a single method to predict donation behav-
iour. For these analyses, we used all potential variables,
meaning that we did not exclude based on low frequencies
(we did not stem previously excluded words, however). With
the expectation that our new analyses may yield more posi-
tive results, we also examined aspects of construct validity
beyond convergent validity. Bleidorn and Hopwood (2019)
note that machine learning techniques often identify vari-
ables that have convergent validity but not necessarily other
aspects of construct validity. For example, word features that
predict charitable giving in the context of one study may be
of limited use if they cannot predict charitable giving enacted
in different types of situations (generalisability) and if they
cannot predict charitable giving over and above convenience
measures like self-report (incremental validity). Conse-
quently, we assessed the generalisability and incremental va-
lidity of variables from each method by (i) examining the
extent to which they predict past charitable involvement
(generalisability) and (ii) observing whether they signiﬁ-
cantly predict charitable giving over and above self-reported
past charitable involvement (incremental validity). Past char-
itable involvement is strongly correlated with veriﬁed dona-
tion behaviour (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011), which in turn
strongly predicts future donations (Prospect Research and
Wealth Screening Statistics, 2015). In our sample, past char-
itable behaviour was correlated with actual donation behav-
iour (proportion of bonus payment donated) in both the
training set (r = .19, 95% [.10, .27], p < .001) and the hold-
out set (r = .16, 95% CI [0.05, 0.28], p = .007). Because we
only measured past charitable involvement in Study 1,
models involving this variable had a smaller sample size
and did not include the study dummy variable.
Manual ratings of universal values
We created a logistic regression model that contained all 10
universal values and the study dummy variable as predictors
of making a donation (Table 5). The model was not a signif-
icant improvement on an intercept-only model,
χ2(11) = 15.87, p = .146. Self-direction was the only signiﬁ-
cant predictor, b = .11, se = .05, odds ratio (OR) = 1.12,
Table 4. Linear regression of “top 10” word features on donation
proportion
Data set b p 95% CI
Career Training 0.19 .002 [0.07, 0.31]
Holdout 0.06 .467 [0.22, 0.10]
Positive* Training 0.11 <.001 [0.05, 0.17]
Holdout 0.07 .144 [0.16, 0.02]
Mind* Training 0.10 .020 [0.17, 0.01]
Holdout 0.02 .628 [0.12, 0.07]
Respect* Training 0.13 .047 [0.24, 0.01]
Holdout 0.12 .045 [0.24, 0.00]
Safe* Training 0.14 .032 [0.26, 0.02]
Holdout 0.08 .520 [0.32, 0.16]
Sister* Training 0.16 .053 [0.32, 0.00]
Holdout 0.08 .581 [0.38, 0.21]
Universalism Training 0.03 .020 [0.06, 0.00]
Holdout 0.03 .197 [0.07, 0.02]
Travel* Training 0.11 .088 [0.01, 0.24]
Holdout 0.13 .242 [0.36, 0.09]
Spend* Training 0.05 .015 [0.01, 0.09]
Holdout 0.03 .432 [0.09. 0.04]
Church Training 0.10 .164 [0.23, 0.04]
Holdout 0.14 .231 [0.36, 0.09]
Study dummy Training 0.05 .009 [0.09, 0.01]
Holdout 0.08 .006 [0.13, 0.02]
Note: * = word stem. Study dummy = the effect of participating in Study 2
rather than Study 1. Coefﬁcients and conﬁdence intervals represent propor-
tion of bonus payment transferred to charity. All tests were two-tailed with
an alpha of .05.
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Z = 2.32, p = .020, 95% CI [0.02, 0.21]. Multicollinearity
was higher in this model than in previous models, but still
modest (all VIFS < 2.42). We conducted the same model
on the holdout set and observed the same pattern: The model
was not a signiﬁcant improvement on an intercept-only
model, χ2(11) = 13.75, p = .247, and self-direction was the
only signiﬁcant predictor, b = .14, se = .07, OR = 2.21,
Z = 2.27, p = .027, 95% CI [0.02, 0.27].
Using the same set of 10 values and the study dummy
variable, we created a linear regression model predicting
donation proportion in the training set (Table 6). The over-
all model was signiﬁcant, F(11, 972) = 1.68, p = .024, ad-
justed R2 = .011. Self-direction was the only value that
signiﬁcantly predicted donations, b = .01, se = .01,
t = 2.16, p = .049, 95% CI [0.00, 0.03]. The same model
was not signiﬁcant in the holdout set, F(11, 484) = 1.37,
p = .185, adjusted R2 = .009, and self-direction was no
longer a signiﬁcant predictor, b = 0.00, se = .01,
t = 0.04, p =.970, 95% CI [0.02, 0.02].
Lastly, we entered the 10 values as predictors of self-
reported charitable acts on both the training set and holdout
set. The model for the training set was non-signiﬁcant,
F(10, 501) = 1.51, p = .132, adjusted R2 = .010. Hedonism
had a signiﬁcant, negative effect, b = .09, se = .03,
t = 2.68, p = .008, 95% CI [0.16, 0.02]; no other effects
were signiﬁcant. The model for the holdout set was also not
signiﬁcant, F(10, 255) = 1.39, p = .186, adjusted R2 = .014.
Self-direction was negatively associated with past charitable
acts, b = .06, se = .03, t = 2.05, p = .042, 95% CI
[0.13, 0.00], opposite of its relationship with the decision
to make a donation during the study. No other effects were
signiﬁcant.
Prosocial dictionary
We ﬁt models in which making a donation at all was
regressed on the number of prosocial dictionary words and
the study dummy variable. Using more prosocial dictionary
words was not a signiﬁcant predictor in the training set,
b = 0.03, se = .03, OR = 0.97, Z = 0.84, p = .403, 95%
CI [0.09, 0.04], or in the holdout set, b = 0.02, se = .05,
OR = 1.02, Z = 0.47, p = .640, 95% CI [0.07, 0.12]. We
then entered the number of prosocial dictionary word fea-
tures participants used and the study dummy variable as pre-
dictors of donation proportion on the training set and holdout
set. The number of prosocial words had a non-signiﬁcant ef-
fect in the training set, b = 0.01, se = .01, t(981) = 1.03,
p = .304, 95% CI [0.02, 0.00] and in the holdout set,
b = 0.00, se = .01, t(493) = 0.05, p = .958, 95% CI
[0.01, 0.01].
Lastly, we correlated the number of prosocial dictionary
words as a predictor of past charitable involvement. The as-
sociation was signiﬁcant in the training set, r(510) = .11,
95% CI [0.02, 0.19], p = .014, but not in the holdout set
r(264) = .08, 95% CI [0.04, 0.20], p = .189. However,
the effect sizes were similar across both data sets and had
highly overlapping CIs. Overall, a composite of prosocial
dictionary words may be linked to past charitable involve-
ment, but there was no evidence of a link with charitable be-
haviour during the study.
Support vector machine
We created a composite of all SVM words with each word
weighted by its average weight across the 10 folds. A binary
Table 6. Linear regression of universal values on donation
proportion
Data set b p 95% CI
Benevolence Training 0.01 .207 [0.02, 0.00]
Holdout 0.00 .901 [0.02, 0.02]
Universalism Training 0.03 .063 [0.06, 0.00]
Holdout 0.02 .279 [0.07, 0.02]
Self-direction Training 0.02 .049 [0.00, 0.03]
Holdout 0.00 .970 [0.02, 0.02]
Stimulation Training 0.00 .843 [0.02, 0.03]
Holdout 0.01 .457 [0.05, 0.02]
Security Training 0.00 .612 [0.01, 0.02]
Holdout 0.00 .923 [0.02, 0.02]
Power Training 0.00 .883 [0.02, 0.02]
Holdout 0.00 .864 [0.02, 0.03]
Achievement Training 0.01 .308 [0.02, 0.01]
Holdout 0.01 .294 [0.01, 0.03]
Hedonism Training 0.00 .344 [0.02, 0.02]
Holdout 0.01 .703 [0.04, 0.02]
Tradition Training 0.01 .530 [0.03, 0.02]
Holdout 0.01 .596 [0.04, 0.03]
Conformity Training 0.00 .658 [0.02, 0.03]
Holdout 0.02 .304 [0.04, 0.01]
Study dummy Training 0.05 .023 [0.09, 0.01]
Holdout 0.08 .007 [0.13, 0.02]
Note: Coefﬁcients and conﬁdence intervals represent proportion of bonus
payment transferred to charity. Study dummy = the effect of participating
in Study 2 rather than Study 1. All tests were two-tailed with an alpha of .05.
Table 5. Logistic regression of universal values on donation
decision
Data set OR p 95% CI
Benevolence Training 0.94 .143 [0.87, 1.02]
Holdout 0.96 .476 [0.84, 1.08]
Universalism Training 0.90 .329 [0.74, 1.11]
Holdout 0.93 .639 [0.68, 1.27]
Self-direction Training 1.12 .020 [1.02, 1.23]
Holdout 1.16 .027 [1.02, 1.32]
Stimulation Training 1.00 .973 [0.85, 1.18]
Holdout 0.83 .121 [0.66, 1.05]
Security Training 0.98 .585 [0.90, 1.06]
Holdout 1.04 .506 [0.93, 1.17]
Power Training 1.03 .597 [0.92, 1.16]
Holdout 1.05 .530 [0.90, 1.25]
Achievement Training 0.94 .230 [0.86, 1.04]
Holdout 0.94 .410 [0.82, 1.08]
Hedonism Training 0.97 .643 [0.85, 1.11]
Holdout 1.06 .605 [0.86, 1.31]
Tradition Training 0.86 .095 [0.73, 1.03]
Holdout 0.88 .294 [0.69, 1.12]
Conformity Training 1.04 .614 [0.90, 1.19]
Holdout 0.92 .380 [0.75, 1.11]
Study dummy Training 1.07 .609 [0.82, 1.41]
Holdout 0.95 .797 [0.65, 1.39]
Note: OR = odds ratio for making a donation. Study dummy = the effect of
participating in Study 2 rather than Study 1. Conﬁdence intervals are
exponentiated. All tests were two-tailed with an alpha of .05.
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logistic regression that included the study dummy variable as
a covariate revealed that the SVM composite was positively
associated with making a donation in the training set,
b = 0.79, se = .12, OR = 2.20, Z = 6.72, p < .001, 95% CI
[0.56, 1.02]. This association was still signiﬁcant and of
nearly identical magnitude after replacing the study dummy
variable with self-reported charitable acts. On the holdout
set, the SVM composite did not signiﬁcantly predict dona-
tion decisions, b = 0.27, se = .15, OR = 1.31, Z = 1.81,
p = .070, 95% CI [0.56, 1.02]. The fact that the holdout re-
gression coefﬁcient was lower than the lower conﬁdence
limit of the same effect in the training data set is consistent
with overﬁtting.
A linear regression demonstrated that the SVM compos-
ite positively predicted donation proportion, b = 0.07,
se = .02, t(982) = 4.48, p < .001, 95% CI [0.04, 0.10]. The
size and signiﬁcance of the effect was qualitatively un-
changed after adding self-reported charitable acts to the
model. But the SVM composite did not signiﬁcantly predict
donation proportion on the holdout set, b = 0.02, se = .02,
t(493) = 1.14, p = .253, 95% CI [0.02, 0.07], again consis-
tent with overﬁtting.
Lastly, we computed the correlation between the SVM
composite and self-reported charitable acts. The association
was positive but only marginally signiﬁcant in the training
set, r(494) = .08, 95% CI [0.01, 0.17], p = .073, and nil
in the holdout set, r(264) = .00, 95% CI [0.11, 0.12],
p = .988. Overall, the SVM was successful only in detecting
word features that predicted study donation behaviour in the
training set.
Exploratory analyses: Can humans extract information
about prosociality from personal strivings?
We found that neither entering all 10 universal values as si-
multaneous predictors, summing together all prosocial words
from a participant’s strivings, nor using a weighted compos-
ite of all SVM words yielded signiﬁcant effects in both the
training and holdout data sets. These null effects imply that
lists of personal strivings are not a rich source of information
about how prosocial people are. However, it is possible that
personal strivings do contain information relevant to dona-
tion behaviour that other coding methods could extract.
We speculated that with sparse text, it is necessary to use
a coding method that (i) can understand the contextual mean-
ing of words and (ii) is designed to predict the outcome of in-
terest. None of the three coding methods we used possess
both features. The manual coding approach met the ﬁrst cri-
terion, but SVM and the prosocial word dictionary methods
did not. The SVM met the second criterion, but the manual
coding and prosocial word dictionary approaches made more
abstract characterisations and were thereby one step removed
from predicting donations.
One coding method that meets both criteria is having hu-
man raters familiar with the design of the original studies
read the personal strivings and guess how much people do-
nated to charity. Not only can human raters understand lan-
guage in context, but they can also accurately perceive how
cooperative a target is from a brief face-to-face interaction,
even when the target has a monetary incentive to convince
others that he or she is cooperative (Sparks, Burleigh, &
Barclay, 2016). It is plausible then that human raters could
detect evidence of a desire to help needy others from par-
ticipants’ strivings, even if some participants tried to pres-
ent themselves as pursuing noble goals. We therefore had
human coders guess participants’ donation amounts and
used their guesses to predict donation behaviour (conver-
gent validity), previous charitable acts (generalisability),
and—for signiﬁcant predictors—donation behaviour over
and above self-reported previous charitable acts (incremen-
tal validity).
Before making predictions, each rater read detailed in-
structions (https://osf.io/qmjyp/) describing the protocols
that participants completed, the purpose of the studies, and
how to complete the task. In addition to guessing how many
cents a given participant gave out of the total number of
cents he or she had available, raters were also instructed
to articulate the primary basis for their prediction by cutting
and pasting words or describing relevant themes they no-
ticed across a participant’s strivings. We had raters articu-
late their decisions to encourage them to make evidence-
based predictions.
There were ﬁve raters overall. Each participant was eval-
uated by two raters, but we did not always have the same two
raters evaluate the same strivings; thus, we regarded the
raters as random effects. We observed poor interrater reliabil-
ity (intraclass correlation coefﬁcient = .47; Koo & Li, 2016),
which is consistent with sparseness affecting the ability of
judges to detect diagnostic information. We averaged the
two raters’ guesses, and then divided this average by the
amount of money participants had available to donate. This
proportion was used to represent raters’ guesses in our re-
gression models.
We ﬁrst created logistic regression models in which do-
nation decisions were regressed upon rater guesses and the
study dummy variable. In the training set, rater guess was a
non-signiﬁcant negative predictor of donation decisions,
b = 0.06, se = 0.22, OR = 0.95, Z = 0.25, p = .801,
95% CI [0.49, 0.38]. The same model yielded similar re-
sults in the holdout set, b = 0.46, se = 0.30, OR = 0.63,
Z = 1.53, p = .127, 95% CI [1.06, 0.13]. We then ﬁt
the same predictor variables to linear regression models in
which donation proportion was the outcome. Rater guess
was a non-signiﬁcant predictor in the training set, b = 0.01,
se = 0.03, t(981) = 0.35, p = .728, 95% CI [0.05, 0.08],
and in the holdout set, b = 0.06, se = 0.04,
t(981) = 1.35, p = .176, 95% CI [0.15, 0.03]. Because
the effect of guesses on donation behaviour were not signif-
icant, we did not examine incremental validity.
We then examined how well guesses predicted past char-
itable involvement. Guessing a higher donation amount was
moderately, positively associated with past charitable in-
volvement in both the training set, r(510) = .17, 95% CI
[0.09, 26], p < .001, and in the holdout set, r(264) = .19,
95% CI [0.08, 31], p < .001. Ironically, rater guesses were
only predictive of past charitable involvement even though
raters were guessing how much participants would donate
within in the study situation.
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DISCUSSION
Individual differences in prosociality are hard to measure be-
cause directly asking people about sociality desirable traits
evokes self-presentation concerns. Qualitative data offer a
potentially more honest source of information about
prosocial traits. Researchers have long relied on manual
methods of coding open-ended text data generated by small
samples of moral exemplars. In a large sample of individuals
who were not selected based on past prosocial acts, we used
the VEiNs manual (Frimer et al., 2009), a prosocial dictio-
nary (Frimer et al., 2014), and an SVM algorithm (Dehghani
et al., 2017) to extract variables from participants’ personal
strivings. The extracted variables were compared in their
ability to predict charitable giving on a training set and hold-
out set.
Although none of these three methods yielded reliable
predictors of donation behaviour, there were two possibly
notable effects. First, self-direction values predicted whether
participants made a non-zero donation in both the initial anal-
yses and in the holdout analysis. This ﬁnding is consistent
with Schwartz’s (2010) suggestion that those high in self-
direction may help others more because they are less worried
about threats to their own well-being. However, the effects
were small and just crossed the thresholds of signiﬁcance
in both the training and holdout sets. Moreover, self-
direction did not predict donation amount in the holdout
set, was not signiﬁcantly associated with self-reported chari-
table behaviour in the training set, and was negatively asso-
ciated with self-reported charitable behaviour in the holdout
set. Second, the number of prosocial dictionary words in peo-
ples’ strivings predicted participants’ reported history of
charitable giving in the training set. Although the effect size
was comparable, this effect did not reach signiﬁcance in the
holdout analyses.
Upon ﬁnding that none of these methods was clearly
useful in explaining variation in charitable giving, we had
human raters try to guess how much participants donated
to charity based on reading their personal strivings. These
guesses were also no better than chance. However, rater
guesses were highly signiﬁcant predictors of past charitable
involvement in both the training and holdout data sets.
Because this analysis was unplanned and was one of a
large number of tests we conducted, we encourage future
researchers to try to replicate this result on new data sets.
If our results are robust, they suggest that past charitable
involvement correlates with raters’ guesses and with
donation behaviour in the research studies for different
reasons.
We speculate that individual differences in charitable
giving are in part due to trait prosociality and in part due
to stable tendencies related to charitable giving speciﬁcally.
That is, donations to charity can reﬂect a genuine desire to
help other people (which would manifest in other behav-
iours and goals beyond charity), as well as charity-speciﬁc
tendencies, such as those related to religious duties (which
would not manifest in contexts unrelated to charitable or-
ganisations). Raters could likely glean evidence of a gen-
eral disposition towards prosociality from people’s
strivings (e.g. based on the number of strivings that re-
ferred to helping other people), and so rater guesses about
charitable donation could have been associated with the
portion of past charitable involvement that reﬂects trait
prosociality. In contrast, donation behaviour during the
studies could relate to tendencies to give to charity specif-
ically, which would not necessarily manifest in personal
strivings. Thus, donation behaviour during the study was
associated with the portion of past charitable involvement
that reﬂects tendencies to give to charity, but not with rater
guesses.
A non-exclusive alternative possibility is that self-
presentation concerns affected reports of past charitable in-
volvement and donations during the study, but not descrip-
tions of personal strivings. Being explicitly asked to donate
to charity elicits concerns about appearing callous (Andreoni,
Rao, & Trachtman, 2017). In contrast, the personal strivings
task ostensibly has nothing to do with prosocial behaviour
and so does not evoke the same self-presentation concerns
(Frimer et al., 2014).
Do personal strivings contain information about
prosociality?
The overall pattern of results imply that strivings do contain
some information about individual differences in charitable
giving, but the method for coding personal strivings and
the outcome measures used matter. We found that only hu-
man raters’ guesses (and possibly the prosocial dictionary)
could predict past charitable involvement, and even human
raters could not guess charitable behaviour during the study.
Using a single behavioural outcome to assess individual dif-
ferences in charitable giving may be too noisy and conse-
quently understate the predictive power of strivings
(Epstein & O’Brien, 1985). For example, someone who
strives to donate to worthy causes may have refrained from
donating in our studies simply because they did not like the
charities that we exposed them to, or because they had al-
ready committed their discretionary funds to another charita-
ble cause. The measure of self-reported past charitable acts is
a fairer criterion in the sense that it was measured at a higher
level of generality.
We also may have had more success predicting donations
had we coded for different content. For instance, many re-
searchers code textual data for generativity, which reﬂects a
preoccupation with making a positive impact on the next
generation (Emmons, 1999; Mansﬁeld & McAdams, 1996)
and is linked to charitable donations (Sikkel &
Schoenmakers, 2012). Alternatively, we may have uncov-
ered stronger predictors had we measured participants’ atti-
tudes towards their own strivings rather than coding their
content. Goodman, Kashdan, Stiksma, and Blalock (2019)
found that although people with social anxiety disorder did
not differ much in the content of their strivings from healthy
people, they were much more likely to report pursuing their
strivings out of controlled motives (e.g. avoiding guilt, pleas-
ing others) rather than autonomous motives (e.g. upholding a
cherished value, pleasure; Deci & Ryan, 2000). Of course,
measuring striving properties using questionnaire methods
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moves away from the idiographic approach that has histori-
cally made open-ended text data appealing to prosocial be-
haviour researchers.
Lastly, it is possible different elicitations of personal
strivings could have enabled even our original three coding
methods to be successful. Perhaps Emmons’ (1999) popular
sentence completion task simply does not yield enough text
to reliably capture relevant content. The prevalence of dictio-
nary and SVM words was low even after removing espe-
cially rare word features and combining together words
together that have the same stem. Even aggregating across
many word features may not be enough to overcome sparse-
ness if the relationships between individual word features
and charitable behaviour are small.
In order to extract information about prosociality from
open-ended text, researchers will likely need to use tasks
that yield either a lot of data or data directly relevant to
prosociality. Increasing the quantity of relevant text will re-
quire personality psychologists to move beyond well-
established measures like the Personal Strivings List that
are simple and cheap to administer. For instance, life story
narratives have shown promise in differentiating moral ex-
emplars from matched controls (Frimer et al., 2011), but
take over an hour to complete and usually require an in-
person interview. When such administrative costs prove
too burdensome, researchers could analyse publicly avail-
able text data generated by individuals that are known to
have engaged in above-average levels of prosocial behav-
iour (e.g. Rand & Epstein, 2014). A third alternative would
be to develop essay tasks in which participants generate a
large amount of text. Regardless of which alternative re-
searchers choose, they must strike a balance between
directing participants to provide text that reﬂects their trait
prosociality while but not being so direct as to elicit so-
cially desirable responding.
Although the problem caused by the brevity of personal
strivings is most apparent for automated methods, they can
also affect the validity of manual methods. Although the least
common universal values were more common than most
SVM and prosocial dictionary words (Table S1), many cod-
ing decisions were educated guesses rather than conﬁdent
judgements. Most raters found coding the strivings difﬁcult
because they contained little text, few participants gave any
indication why they pursue the goals that they described,
and the VEiNs manual did not give guidance on how to code
many strivings that were common in our data sets (likely be-
cause the manual was originally applied to exemplar studies
rather than to studies sampling from the Mechanical Turk
population). Achieving minimal standards for interrater reli-
ability (κ ≥ .60) partially depended on agreeing to coding
rules that were plausible but of unveriﬁable validity (see
https://osf.io/q85d4/).
CONCLUSION
We set out to discover whether automated approaches could
rival or even improve upon manual coding of qualitative
data. We used prediction of donation behaviour as a
yardstick of performance, given that researchers have his-
torically used strivings and other open-ended text measures
to gain insight into prosocial behaviour. Expecting an em-
barrassment of riches, we found that neither manual nor
automated methods extracted striving features that were re-
liably associated with either actual donation behaviour or
self-reported past charitable behaviour. Instead, raters’
guesses of donation amounts predicted past charitable in-
volvement, but not donation behaviour during the study.
Raters’ ability to extract whatever context they believed
was relevant to identifying charitable individuals may ex-
plain why their guesses were more accurate than the orig-
inal coding methods we used. Although personal strivings
are just one kind of qualitative data that might be used
to capture individual differences in prosociality, our ﬁnd-
ings suggest that the utility of qualitative data in yielding
insight into prosocial individuals can be highly dependent
on measurement decisions.
Our results serve as a cautionary tale that big data analy-
sis strategies cannot overcome inherent weaknesses in data
such as text sparseness. On the other hand, a routine feature
of big data analysis—cross-validation—is precisely what en-
abled us to conclude that ostensible predictors of charitable
giving were unlikely to prove useful in new samples. With-
out our holdout analyses, we may have come to more posi-
tive conclusions about using personal strivings to
understand or predict prosocial behaviour. In doing so, we
may have inspired other researchers to squander their re-
sources. Our use of a holdout also gave us licence to conduct
a wide range of exploratory tests without great risk of basing
our conclusions on false positives: Any chance associations
that we might have ‘uncovered’ in the training set presum-
ably would not have replicated in the holdout. It is for this
reason that we can have some conﬁdence that the association
between rater guesses and self-reported charitable acts is not
merely the product of chance. We conclude that regardless of
whether personality psychologists use data-driven techniques
to better understand behaviour, they could shorten the cycle
of self-correction in science by borrowing big data tech-
niques designed to reduce overﬁtting.
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